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ALBERT BALLIN, 
THE HAMBURG-AMERICA LINE 
ANDHAMBURG 
1. Introduction 
Structure and Strategy 
in the German Shipping Industry (1886-1914) 
BY FRANK BROEZE 
The theme of this article is the transformation of the Hamburg-America Line (HAL; its offi­
cial German name was Harnburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt Actien-Gesellschaft, often 
abbreviated tO Hapag)1 from a purely North Atlantic shipping company into a global enter­
prise and, in particular, how the HAL's policies were shaped and executed by its Ieader, Albert 
Ballin. Ballin (1857-1918) was one of the most successful and remarkable personalities in inter­
national shipping and a highly prominent business Ieader in Wilhelmine Germany. Wirhin a 
dozen years of his entering the HAL he made ir the biggest shipping company of Germany and 
the world. He never ceased to intensify and expand irs network of services so that the HAL in 
early 19 1 4, with a share capital of 180,000,000 marks and debemures to the value of about 
80, 000, 000 marks, possessed a fleet of over 1 .3 million GRT. With rhe single exception of 
Australia, the company was acrive in all continents and aceans of the world. 
Growth and concemration were the hallmark of the imperialist and social-darwinist era of 
modern capitalism.2 Like in industry and banking ashore, at sea ever I arger and more powerful 
companies arose. The merchant fleets of Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan and the other 
maritime nations were increasingly dominared by !arge Iiner companies and their Ieaders such 
as Ballin, Heinrich Wiegand (N01·th German Lloyd), Thomas Sutherland (P & 0), Inchcape 
(British lndia) or John Ellerman. Competition between the companies was extremely sharp, 
reflecting the social-darwinist "Zeitgeist", yet they vinually always combined forces in canels 
or agreements, the so-called conferences.3 In international shipping the Hamburg-America 
Line was the most extreme example of this convergence of power. Far more than Britain's tra­
ditional liner companies did in their homeporrs', the HAL dominared Hamburg. In 1886 the 
company had counred only 62 , 000 GRT or about 25% of the city's total steam tonnage. By 
19 1 4, however, its tonnage had grown to 1 .35 million GRT which constituted over SO% of 
Hamburg's fleet. 5 The HAL had clearly distanced itself from the North German Lloyd of Bre­
men (983,000 GRT) which until 189 7 had been Germany's largest shipping enterprise.6 Not 
less important, a number of agreements and joint ventures linked the HAL with almost all 
other Harnburg Iiner companies and gave Ballin's company considerable power and influence 
on their affairs. Through common directorates with steamshipping companies as weil as lead­
ing shipbroking firms an even greater concentration of power was achieved_7 Finally, intimate 
Connections existed between Ballin and other Ieaders of the HAL and the commercial and po­
litical elite of Hamburg. With justice, Rohrmann has stressed the importance of the "personal 
136 
union" between the HAL and the local Chamber of Commerce (through Laeisz, Schinckel and 
others ). 8 
As the HAL ruled Hamburg, so Albert Ballin ruled the HAL. Although he never held abso­
lute power, also not after he was made "Generaldirektor" in 1899 9, he took all initiatives and 
made all decisions wirhin the HAL relating to such Strategie matters as, for example, the open­
ing of new lines, the ordering of new tonnage, the increasing of the company's capital, the 
beginning and ending of rate wars, and especially rhe conduct of shipping diplomacy and con­
cluding of agreements with his rivals. Ballin was not dominared or even pushed by the HAL's 
financiers and bankers; on the contrary, the latters' main representative, Max von Schinckel, 
was sometimes accused of being an impediment rather than a positive influenceY 
A new assessment of the dramaric growth of the HAL and Ballin's leadership and strategy 
is long overdue, even if the company and Ballin have been rhe subject of a !arge m1mber of 
monographs and biographical works. At least ten more or less original studies have been de­
voted to Ballin personally. 11 Although the most recent of these, by Ce eil and Hauschild-Thies­
sen, are somewhat more critical in their appraisal than their predecessors, there is neverrheless 
a virrually unanimous and unqualified praise for Ballin's commercial conduct. (This specific­
ally excludes his political activity, as far as that did not concern the HAL, and also his socio­
industrial policies wirhin  the company. ) As already was the case during his lifetime, the 
immense growth of the company is regarded as Ballin's greatest achievement. Not far behind, 
however, and often directly and organically linked to the form er, these authors emphasise how 
Ballin acred t o  limit compet it ion in int ernat ional shipping t hrough t he format ion of j oint ven­
t ures and cart els, so-called pools and conferences . . . and t o  ensure t hat all p a r t i c i p a n  t s [ my 
emphasis, F.B.] could enj oy sat isfact ory result s t hrough rat e fixing, delineat ion of spheres of in­
fluence and t he sharing of profits. 1 2  
Almost pure panegyrics are borh early and, despite their many shorrcomings, highly in­
formative biographies by Ballin's former collaborators, Huldermann and Srubman n. Bur the 
opinion of Kurr Himer, before the Great War rhe Ieader of rhe HAL's propaganda bureau (the 
Literarische Büro), is fully representative of the consensus on Ball in in his role as t he great cre­
at or of int ernat ional underst anding in world shipping.1 3  A s  t he man of compromise1 4 and t he 
man who worked hard t o  fost er friendly relat ions and t o  negot iat e for mut ually profit able 
agreement s bet ween compet it ors in world shipping1 5 Ballin appears as an apostle ofimernation­
al peace rather than as the ruthless protagonist of rhe interests of rhe HAL. Ir is true, Ballin's 
best friends did not deny that he could fight long and hard, but they insisted - and many histor­
ians with them - that that was no more than tactical play. In their view Ballin was a man of 
peace and a supporter of all German shipping interests. Often it is emphasised how Ballin,  
despite many and grave problems, succeeded in maintaining a t ie of friendship with the North 
German Lloyd. 
A totally different image arises as soon as one adopts another than Hamburg perspective. It 
is useful to remember that the conference system was not created by Ballin but originated in 
the 1870s in the trade of British India after the collapse of the Suez Canal steam mania. Also the 
foundations for the first continental North Atlantic conference, the Nordatlantischer Damp­
ferlinien-Verband, were laid as early as 1885, before Ball in entered the HAL. But i n  Bremen 1 6 
and, for example, the Netherlands17 the HAL and the Hamburg shipping companies which 
were associated with it were not so much seen as friendly partners but rather as direct threats 
to the prosperity and even the very existence of their local shipping interests. But, equally 
imporrantly, also when one probes a bit further in Hamburg itself and Iooks beyond the p ropa­
ganda which the HAL and its supporters churned out in great mass, serious cracks appear in 
the picture of consensus. Many in Hamburg already at the time knew that behind the scenes 
things were not quite as the HAL propaganda machine painted them. 1 8  Although it is, perhaps, 
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understandable, that Harnburg shipping historians have taken Iinie notice of extraneous cri­
tiques, it remains astanishing that so linle attention has been paid to the views of Johannes 
Merck, Ballin's own financial director, Max von Schinckel, who as chairman of the Board of 
Control was Ballin's counterpart inside the HAL, or also other prominent Harnburg shipping 
personaliries. Even if some, but by no means all, of these had ground tO resent Ballin's policies, 
their opinions were often based on hard facts and can not be pushed aside as irrelevant. Indeed, 
Ballin's plans and manceuvres often caused considerable binerness, opposition and criticism. 
In consequence, it may be questioned whether the growth and expansion of the HAL wirhin 
Harnburg was as "natural" and friendly a process as the p rotagonists of the company and Ballin 
claimed. 
In the revolutionary process, during which the HAL from 189 7 was transformed from a 
orth Atlantic into a general or global shipping company, three separate yet closely connected 
elements or spheres can be distinguished. First, there is the geographical expansion of the net­
work of the HAL's services and the company's growing power wirhin Harnburg vis-a-vis the 
city's other steam navigation companies; second, the fundamental rivalry with the North Ger­
man Lloyd of Breme n ;  and, third, the relationship between the HAL and its foreign competi­
tors, such as the Cunard and White Star Lines, the Royal Mai! Group, the Koninklijke Hol­
landsehe Lloyd, the various ltalian companies or also the Austro-Americana of Trieste. This 
article will deal with the first sphere that of Ballin's position wirhin Hamburg; essays on the 
other two themes can be found elsewhere.19lt may be useful, however, first to outline the three 
main periods in which the Ballin era can be divided; 
1. from 1886 to 189 7, when the HAL after the merger with the Carr-Linie and und er Bal­
lins's leadership in its passenger department regained its strength but restricted its activiries to 
the North Atlantic. Although by 1900 it was the world's biggest shipping company (620,000 
GRT), rhe HAL still lagged far behind the Lloyd in the passenger trade ;  
2 .  from 189 7  to 191 0, when the HAL, since 1 899 led by Ballin as "Generaldirektor", in 
quick tempo broke into a !arge number of new trading regions and, with the exception of 
Australia, served all cominems (1910/11 fleet size: 1 ,02 0,000 GRT); and 
3. from 191 0 to the outbreak of war in July 191 4, when the HAL, despite massive growth 
in virrually all directions (1913/1 4 fleet size, 1 ,360,000 GRT), through the construction of the 
giant IMPERATOR, VATERLAND and BISMARCK redirected the bulk of its investments to the 
traditionall\'orth Atlantic trade and, in so doing, raised significant questions about its true 
nature and even its very existence. 
Alrhough there were both general commercial crises and many localised economic problems 
throughout this period, rhe overall trend in imperial Germany's economy and, in particular, 
in that of her foreign trade and emigration was sharply upward. Ballin and the HAL worked 
wirhin an almost uniquely positive economic climate and conjuncture. 
2. The Pattern of Expansion 
The first phase of expansion of the HAL after Ballin's entry in 1886 was characterised by a 
twin-barrelled policy of inner revitalisation and external security through mergers and agree­
ments. Typically, Ballin's consolidation always contained the seeds of expansion. The "Peace" 
of 1886, which brought the merger between the HAL and the Carr-Linie and established Bal­
lin as the Ieader of the HAL's passenger department, made an end to a disastraus competition 
between shipowners and brokers. All realised only too weil that Hamburg, despite the city's 
superior location, had fallen far behind in the steam shipping trade with the USA which, more­
over, in future years was capable of funher great expansion. Wirhin the HAL Ballin was wel-
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comed and immediarely accepted by the Board of Contra! and, especially irs Chairman, Carl 
Laeisz. Such recognition by Hamburg's leading shipping identities was not only based on pro­
faund respect for Ballin's experrise in the passenger trade20 but also reflected the desperate 
siruation of the HAL. Ir is possible to discern how much rhe company's patrician Ieaders saw 
the need to bring about a change of generations which, in the process, also meant the introduc­
tion of modern technocracy. Ir is not unlikely thar rhey also realised that, just when Bismarck's 
new imperial mail contracts (viz. to East Asia and Australia) had been given to the North Ger­
man Lloyd, in their circles in Harnburg no man existed like H. H. Meier in Bremen who, in 
Arnold Otto Meyer's words, possesses t he fullest confidence of all his fellow cit izens and who, 
t hus support ed and st rengt hened, could wield all power which such unit y creat es. Unit y brings 
vict ory.21 Some, in assessing developmenrs in Bremen, perhaps also looked forward and recog­
nised that the model to be followed was that of the brilliant and non-patrician young director 
of the Lloyd, August Lohmann.2 2  Thus they contrasred the vibrant young Bai !in as the modern 
manager [Generaldirektor-typus ]23 with the worn-out and unimaginative patrician, Adolph 
Godeffroy. Wharever the exact motives of Ballin's appointment, with him the "managerial 
revolution"24 entered the HAL and Harnburg steam shipping. 
lt was also Laeisz who in 1888 made Ballin a director of the HAL and threw his full weight 
behind Ballin's policies. These included a significant new capital emission and, in 1892 , rhe 
purchase of the Dampfschiff-Rhederei Hansa25, of which Laeisz hirnself was the Ieader. This 
signified further rationalisation and concentration in Hamburg's American trade and, at the 
same time, definitive hegemony for the HAL which itself since Ballin's entry had opened new 
services to Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Orleans, Boston and Montreal. Also the seasonal 
winter services of the Hansa between the USA and the West Indies fitted tailor-made in the 
growing Iiner network of the HAL which since the early 1870s had included services from 
Harnburg to the Caribbean and Mexico. Du ring these same years rhe Harnburg-Südamerika­
nische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft [Hamburg-Süd] and the newly-founded Deutsche 
Ost-Afrika Linie (DOAL), recognising the HAL's experience and well-organised net work of 
over 3,000 agencies and numerous general agencies, transfered control over their passenger 
trade to it.26 During the middle 1890s, when Hamburg's terrible cholera epidemic of 1892 ex­
acerbared rhe effects of the general trade depression, the HAL already showed remarkable re­
silience on its complex North Atlantic networkY 
The first major expansion of the HAL outside rhe Nonh Atlanric, the opening to East Asia, 
was precipitated by the imminent expiration of the imperial mail contracts of 1885. Since rhe 
early 1870s rhe Harnburg-China trade was maintained by the Deutsche Dampfschiffs-Rhede­
rei zu Hamburg, or Kingsin-Linie. In comparison with the imperial mail service of the Lloyd, 
however, the Kingsin Line had a much smaller fleet of inferior quality.28 In the early 1890s the 
line had almost been an nihilated by a failed attempt to open a second line, to the Durch East 
Indies. By 189 7 it was as unable as it had been in 1885 to challenge for at least a part of the new 
mail contract which, again, was to run for fifteen years, from 1 J anuary 1900 to 3 1  December 
1914.  Bur before any initiative could arise to inject new finance into the Kingsin Line, which 
after all had a quaner of a century experience in East Asian warers, and thus make it a plausible 
contender Ballin intervened by announcing that the HAL itself would be interesred in bidding 
for rhe contract. Ballin was driven by the desire to attack rhe Lloyd outside the Nonh Atlantic 
in its second-most important field, where its director Heinrich Wiegand had just made an 
extensive and highly successful fact-finding mission which included the purchasing of two 
local British-owned shipping companies.29 Unable to leave the field to others, Ball in was great­
ly assisted by the fact that the Kingsin Line's financial problems had led to severe differences 
of opinion which, in turn, virrually paralysed its Board of Directors. At the same time Ballin 
operared on the political scene in Berlin. Demonstrating his determinarion by acrually begin-
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ning a HAL service to China, his double strategy bore fruit. Secretary of State Podbielski 
forced the Ieaders of the Lloyd to negotiate with Ballin and to reach an agreement in which the 
mail contract was divided between the two contestants.30 
Ir needs to be observed that Ball in did not attack the Hamburg-based Deutsch-Australische 
Dampfschiff-Gesellschaft [DADG] and thus did not challenge the Lloyd in the Australian­
Pacific mail contract. Strategically, Ballin was certainly right in preferring the Far East to 
Australia. Just at this time of social-darwinist enthusiasm for adventures overseas31, all com­
mercial and polirical attention was rivetted on China whose potential market was regarded as 
far more important than that of the far less populous Australian colonies. Even so, it is re­
markable that Ballin soon afterwards agreed with borh the Lloyd and Ütto Harms, the man­
aging director of the DADG, to keep the HAL away from Australian watersY lt is impossible 
to be cerrain about Ballin's morives in leaving rhe DADG alone. 33 Probably he was led by a 
mixture of considerations, including his documented respect for Harms (as he hirnself a tech­
nocrat born outside traditional Harnburg shipping circles)34; his respect for the strong and 
well-organized conference in the Australian trade35; his own role in the creation of the DADG 
which had directly led to his entry into the HAL's direcrorate36; his friendship with the late 
Jacob Meyer, the senior partner of DADG's freight brokers Knöhr & Burchard Nfl.; and, 
finally, the wish of the HAL's own Board of Conrrol to stay away from the strong DADG. 
While the Australian trade did not seem capable of rapid expansion, the DADG had trump 
cards in its exclusive contracts for the shipment of dynamite to South Africa en raute to 
Australian ports and its horneward lines from the Dutch East IndiesY In the final analysis, the 
HAL would not have found it easy to finance a double expansion into East Asia and Australia. 
Between 189 7 and 1901 its capital was increased from 30 to 80 million marks and it also issued 
debentures to a value of 2 7.5 million marks. Ir was rhese enormaus financial demands which 
had also induced Ballin to suspend the HAL's service to Bengal which he had acquired through 
the takeover of the sickly Hamburg-Calcutta Linie.38 
Ir is well-known how the entry of the Rickmers-Linie of Bremen into the Hamburg-China 
trade gave Ballin the opportunity to force the hand of the Kingsin Line. When the North Ger­
man Lloyd bought its ships, Ballin moved swiftly and, in turn, bought the Lloyd's Hamburg 
freight broker. Thus he was able to direct all Hamburg exports to the HAL, a tactical strake 
of genius which made a deep impression in Hamburg.39 The General Meeting of the Kings in 
Line of 26 March 1898, two months after Ballin had sent hisfirst ship to China, could do little 
eise but ro sell out ro the HAL. In similar fashion, Ballin in February 19 01 forced the expatriate 
German shipowner M. Jebsen ro sei I him his two mail Steamers for the new HAL coastal ser­
vice from Shanghai via Kiaochow to Tientsin. As had been the case with the Kingsin Line and 
the Lloyd itself, these aggressive acquisitions left severe scars in the relationship between Ball in 
and the victims of his expansionary policies.4° The East Asian network was completed by the 
takeover of the ships of the Chinesische Küstenfahrt Gesellschaft, which was led by Ballin's 
friend and HAL Board of Control member Woldemar Nissen, and the opening of a new ser­
vice from Hamburg to Vladivosrok and Nikolaievsk. Typically, in the latter already two Ham­
burg firms operared but that was not sufficient w keep Ballin out. 
If the Kingsin Line had been the weakest and least-respected of all Hamburg's overseas ship­
ping companies, the reverse was true of the Hamburg-Süd which in 1900 came into Ballin 's 
sights. Also this company had been founded in the "Gründerjahren" of the early 1870s but its 
services w Brazil and La Plata had been far more successful and profitable. Between 1886 and 
1900 it had paid the highest dividends of all Hamburg shipping companies41 and through its 
Direcrors and Board of Control it was as intimately linked ro the Harnburg patriciate as the 
HAL itself.<2 Also here Ballin's attack was precipitated by a tactical opportunity, in this case 
a bitter fight between the Hamburg-Süd and newcomers A. C. de Freiras & CoY But he was 
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by no rneans motivated by short renn circumstances or defensive considerations. Ballin wan­
ted to enter the South American trade mit Gewalt4 , i.e. wirbout tolerating any opposition and 
if necessary with force, and that with good reason as both passenger traffic and export volumes 
from South America rose rapidly. The high dividends of the Harnburg-Süd were the best proof 
that high profits could be made in the trade. 
The traditional accOLint of this episode revolves around the claim that the exhausting 
struggle with de Freiras induced the Hamburg-Süd to seek assistance frorn the HAL.45 In this 
version Ballin bought the fleet of de Freitas, after which the Harnburg-Süd volumarily offered 
a share of their trade to the HAL. Huldermann conceded that Ballin valued the South Amer­
ican trade so highly that he bought de Freitas' line and ships at an exorbitant price, uttering the 
farnous phrase I kno w but I want the bus ines s . But he p rovided no details about the purchase 
contract with de Freiras and drew no conclusions from this remarkable frankness.46 It is, how­
ever, possible to assess this episode in a totally different light. The buying of de Freitas' line 
gave Ballin a powerful instrument to force the Hamburg-Süd, which had been hurt but by no 
means badly damaged, to accept the HAL as partner in its tradeY Despite de Freitas' success 
in gaining the agency of the resourceful firm of Tb. Wille & Co. in Rio de Janeiro and Santos 
and capturing a part of the Brazilian coffee exports48, his line by the end of 1900 was virtually 
exhausted [praktis ch erledi gt).49 The Hamburg-Süd, in collaboration with its conference part­
ner North German Lloyd, could easily have maintained its position and should have made an 
offer to de Freitas.50 But when the cornpany failed to act, Ballin saw his chance. After brief 
negotiations the Hamburg-Süd had to concede defeat. The powerplay and the surrender took 
place on the highest Ievel :51 
T he co ntract beweeen the HAL and H ambu1·g-Sü d was an exclus ive matter between 
Ballin and Carl L aeis z. T he o ther members o f  the Bo ard o f  Co ntra! and the directo rs o f  
the H arn burg-Sü dfirs t knew o f  it, when the co nt1·act's draft was s ubmi tted to them i n  
p r i n  t. [my emphasis, F.B.]52 
Johannes Merck, Ballin's financial d irector and intimate friend of Hamburg's patriciate, 
suggested a possible explanation for Laeisz' actions which stood in such stark contrast with his 
well-known affection for the Hamburg-Süd.53 According to him, Ballirr had already much ear­
lier exerted pressure on the Ieaders of that company but wirbout success. Finally he made 
Laeisz, who was depressed by the early death of his brilliant son C. Ferd., such a good offer for 
his shares that the latter gave up his resistance. Instead of preserving the independence of "his" 
Hamburg-Süd, Laeisz allowed his protege Ballin to move in on it. There is a photograph of 
Laeisz and Ballin together on the deck of one of Laeisz' big sailing-ships which is symbolic for 
the succession of the generations which this transaction signified. 54 After the surrender of 
Laeisz the other Ieaders of the Hamburg-Süd had no other choice but to give in to Ballin's 
demands: a full one-third share for the HAL in Hamburg's Brazil and La Plata trades. Free will 
played no role in the conclusion of this agreement. 
As Merck and von Schinckel, who was a member of the Board of Control of both HAL and 
Hamburg-Süd, have ernphasised in their memoires, Ballin never took the pressure off the latter 
company, probably with the ultimate aim of incorporating it into the HAL.55 In order to 
understand the dynamics of this continued rivalry it is vital to understand the nature of the 
companies' pooling arrangement. Although the tonnageto be employed in the trade was divid­
ed on a basis of 2/3 for the Harnburg-Süd and 1 13 for the HAL, the division of the joint ven­
ture's profits was made according to the current book value of the vessels employed by each 
company. Thus, to the disgust of the Hamburg-Süd Ieaders, the excessive p rice paid for de 
Freitas' ships worked to advantage of the HAL as they had to pay the HAL in 1902 and 1903 
over 1 .2 million marks in compensation. To add insult to injury Ball in already in J une 1901 let 
the Hamburg-Süd officially know that his fleet was incapable of meeting the required Standard 
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of services to South America.56 Until1914 the HAL consistently employed weil over 1 /3 of the 
book value in the trade. After the top years 1902 and 19 03, in which its participation amounted 
to no less than 43.08% and 40 .1 7% ,  its share ranged from the lowest point of 33.95% in 1905 
to 39 .82% in 1 91 0. But per voyage its vessels were far less p rofitable than those of the Harn­
burg-Süd and from 1904 to 19 1 0  the HAL received funher 1 . 6  million marks in compensation; 
had the companies not decided in 1904 to accept a maximum of 300,000 marks for these pay­
ments another 1.2 million marks had been dueY In early 1 911 the maximum was lowered fur­
ther to 200. 000 marks.58 
Ballin also p ressurised the Harnburg-Süd in his dealings with other companies. In 1902 he 
demanded a share for the HAL in the Brazilian coffee im ports of Rotterdam, which until then 
had been the subject of an exclusive contract shared in equal parts by the Harnburg-Süd and 
North German Lloyd.S9 The Lloyd refused flatly to make any concessions wirhaut adequate 
compensation elsewhere and the Hamburg-SLid became the victim of rhis powerplay. 
But henceforth the Hamburg-Süd was able to organise its defences, not in the least because 
the company strengthened itself through the election to its Board of Control of powerful men 
like Max von Schinckel, Adolph Woermann and "King" Richard Krogmann. Significant was 
that both von Schinckel, a "collector" of directorates, and Krogmann, who did not value such 
board memberships, were particularly keen to proteer and assist the Hamburg-Süd.6° Krog­
mann may weil have been motivated by a desire to counter Ballin's aggressive policies, as he 
had been one of the Ieaders of the Kings in Line, but he and von Schinckel evidently were also 
impressed with the opportunities in the South American trade and respect for rhe management 
of the Hamburg-Süd's capable director, Theodor Amsinck 61 Krogmann's son Carl Vincent, 
rhe later Nazi mayor of Hamburg, in his memoires testified from personal experience to rhe 
continued and bitter rivalry between HAL and Hamburg-Süd.61 After the initial shock, the lat­
ter gave as much as it got. When in 19 09/1910 the original contract bctween rhe two companies 
was running out, the Hamburg-Süd did not, as many had expected, l1ave to concede a further 
share in rhe trade to rhe HAL.63 
How bad the relationship between the two companies was, appears eloquently from a Ietter 
written by Ball in du ring rhis period. In it he referred to the perfectly unintelligible behaviour 
of rhe Hamburg-Süd's leadership whom he accused of being totally removed Jtom any com­
mercial logic6'Very much to Ballin's chagrin, rhe Hamburg-Süd often took an acrive role and 
did not hesitate to expand their fleet wirh ever I arger vessels. \X'hen, in 1912, the Harnburg-Süd 
ordered rhe CAP TRAFALGAR of almost 20,000 GRT, Ballin insisted that the Hamburg-Süd 
and HAL agree not to build ships exceeding the dimensions of rhat ship without a specific 
agreement.65 Bur shortly later he himself ordered no less rhan rhree ships of c. 20,000 tons for 
the HAL's service.66 Although ultimately intended to counter the four-ship SIERRA-class of 
the Lloyd, it was once again the Hamburg-Süd which became the direct target of Ballin's 
expansionary policies. The ourbreak of war intervened before the HAL's new trio was com­
pleted and it was not until1921 rhat rhe South American service could be resumed. Under all 
these circumstances one can understand Theodor Amsinck's profound irritation that Mathies, 
in his "Hamburgs Reederei", discussed the South American trade from 1900 primarily as a 
field of the HAL and dealt wirh the Hamburg-Süd by writing that all important issues had al­
ready been mentioned !67 
A rhird field which the HAL entered in 1900, was the west coast of South and Central Amer­
ica. This was the p reserve of the Deutsche Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft Kosmos, as so many 
others a product of the "Gründerzeit". During the boom of the late 1890s the Kosmos had in­
creased its capiral from 3 to 11 million marks and opened new services to Patagonia and Cali­
fornia. Its results in 1899 had been most satisfactory [recht erfreulich] and after p roviding for 
1 .5 million marks in depreciarion the company had paid a dividend of 11 % (1898: 9% ).68 Ball in 
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saw his chance, when the p rospectus of a new company was circulated in Hamburg's ship ping 
circles. Through the HAL and Kosmos he arranged for a paymemof 500, 000 marks to be made 
to its promoters, F. C. Bramslöw and C.W. Dahlström69, and shorrly afterwards it was an­
nounced that the Kosmos voluntarily had affered a share in its business to the HAL.70 The 
agreement had been mediared through Kosmos director Wilhelm Volckens, who was a partner 
in the HAL's New York agency, Funch Edye & Co., and had in 189 7 arranged the sale of Kir­
sten's Hamburg-Calcutta Line to the HAL. Merck believed that it was likely that Ballin had 
used Volckens to obtain inside information.71 In general, he commented on this case, Ballin 
had a fine nose for smelling if something stank in the neighbourhood and for creating an oppor­
tunity to become involved. Shipping brokers with inside information and who knew Ballin 's 
nature, of course, were keen to bring it to his attention; after all, that was their business7 2 
Du ring the next years the HAL made an increasing number of steamers available to the joint 
service with the Kosmos and the line showed a steady growth. Somewhat surprisingly, Bremen 
did not respond to the HAL's expansion umil1905 with the Lloyd-related Roland Linie.73 In 
the course of this bitter struggle Ballin was able to capitalise on his dominaring position in 
Harnburg and establish the so-called Syndikats-Rhederei. This was a fighting company under 
the control of the HAL, which signed for 55% of its 6 million marks capital, but with the parri­
cipation of all other major Hamburg steam shipping companies.74 The confrontation ended 
with a compromise and a four-cornered joint-venture including the HAL, Kosmos, Roland 
Line and North German Lloyd. The imminent opening of the Panama Canal from 1912 
brought considerable uncerrainty and instability in the relationship between HAL and Kos­
mos. At one point even rumours circulated that the Kosmos would be merged into the HAL, 
but p rofessional circles generally counted on the Kosmos having to make major concessions.75 
Also here the outbreak of war intervened before any specific steps could be taken. 76 As the 
Harnburg-Süd on the east coast, the Kosmos in its parrietdar field was not so much a partner 
but rather a stepping stone for the HAL. 
The first years after 1 9 00 were overshadowed by the formation of the Morgan Trust and its 
aftermath77, and a market depression in the freight market. When the economic climate im­
proved, Ballin was initially p reoccupied with his lucrative but politically highly sensitive coal 
contracts with the imperial Russian fleet.78 Bur he also entered the east Siberian trade, forcing 
the HAL on a small group of local shipping brokers worked with chanered ships.79 Services to 
rhe Far East were rationalised in a clever agreement with the Lloyd in which the latter, once 
again, took over the entire mail service and the presrige but the HAL kept the profitable freight 
lines. Soon afterwards, however, rhe peace was disturbed by the Roland Line's attack on the 
west coast of South America; soon afterwards Ballin countered by entering another two new 
areas: the Persian Gulf and Africa. 
The imperial government by 1906 was increasingly keen to establish a German shipping pre­
sence in the Persian Gulf in order to possess a tangible and effective argument in their geopoli­
tically crucial negotiations with Britain ab out the construction of the Baghdad railway.80 Until 
that time British interests had enjoyed not just a monopoly of the river traffic in Iraq but also 
a dominaring position in the steam shipping of the Gulf itself. Undisputed leader was the quasi­
official British India Steam Navigation Company [BISNJ under the leadership of one of the 
British Empire's leading businessmen, Sir James Mackay ( 1912:  Lord Inchcape) 81 No direct 
service existed between Germany and the Gulf and, as the operations of BISN demonstrated, 
the Gulf trade was closely intertwined with that of the west coast of British India, another area 
where the HAL had no p resence. 
It is not known, whether the DDG Hansa of Bremen at that time considered taking up the 
Gulf trade; this company began its soon highly successful services not until after World War 
I.S2 But the Deutsche Ost-Afrika Linie, which often had its ships return to Hamburg from 
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Bombay and rhe Indian west coasr, was keen ro esrablish a line ro Persia and Basra.83 Its Ieaders 
probably were morivated by rhe desire to reduce rhe paralysing effects of rheir East African 
mail comract and branching out into a promising new area. As member of rhe Board of Con­
trol of the DOAL Ball in, however, could not fail ro become aware of these plans and wirhin 
a few months the HAL desparched irs first sreamer on rhe new roure. Merck believed that Bal­
lin's main motive was not to assist German rrade in rhe region but to impress the imperial 
government in Berlin84, but these two elements are inextricable imerwoven. The service cer­
tainly was far from profitable (umil 1913 it incurred Iosses of 2.5 million marks), and at one 
srage Ballin even considered the possibiliry of a state subsidy.85 Bur precisely because the ser­
vice was run at a loss and by rhe Hamburg-America Line many observers in Britain and else­
where believed that it had profound political significance. The emir of Kuwait, by then a 
British protectorate, refused the HAL's local agents, Roben Wonckhaus & Co. , to open an 
office in his rown.86 Much more than in his opening of rhe line to Arabia and Persia Ballin 
showed in the Africa trade how he was rurhlessly capable of exploi ring rhe smallest tactical op­
portunities. For a long time the Hamburg-based Woermann Line had been the only German 
company in rhe trade. Bur after the conclusion of the Herero War in Southwest Africa (where 
both rhe HAL and rhe Lloyd bad shared in the German government's charters) it was suddenly 
confromed by competition from the Harnburg-Bremer Afrika Linie. When the HABAL 
received support from rhe Lloyd, Ballin saw his chance. In preseming rhe Woermann Line as 
"unhealthy", the HAL announced that it had responded positively to a Woermann request for 
assisranceY In reality, however, the Woermann Line was not in trouble and had sufficient 
employmem for irs sreamers 88 As was repeatedly tesrified before rhe British Royal Commis­
sion imo Shipping Rings, rhe Woermann Line had an excellent reputation with its Brirish 
cusromers and was, whenever possible, preferred over irs British rival Eider Dempster. 89 
Also after rhe Lloyd stepped in behind the HABAL Adolph Woermann did not need the 
HAL's support. He did not req uest it. I t was, on rhe contrary, Ball in who wem to Woermann. 
In the presence of Arnold Amsinck, the line's manager, Ball in declared rhat he could not allow 
the Lloyd to esrablish irself in a field where the HAL did not operate. His company could now 
not remain outside the African trade. As Amsinck later summarised it: Woermann was simply 
raped. !t was this [ rather than a dispure with the imperial government over chartering expen­
ses J which later rankled him so much. 90 If Ballin's vicrory over Carl Laeisz and the Harnburg­
Süd can to a certain extent still be regarded as a volumary change of generations, such a view 
can not apply to the case of Woermann. Ir must also be emphasised that Mathies accepted 
Amsinck's version of events in his 1 928 hisrory of Hamburg shipping91 And it was with par­
ticular reference to rhis revised account that E. Wiskemann, in his review of Stubmann's bio­
graphy of Ballin, argued that that book, as Huldermann's work a few years previously, con­
tained less a critical biography than a hagiography of the HAL's former leader.9 2 
The HAL's new Africa service was managed by the Woermann Line, clear evidence that irs 
presence in African waters and power behind rhe scenes rather than managerial control were 
Ballin's highest priority. Through its participation in the Woermann Line the HAL also 
became parr-owner in three other African companies: the DOAL, the Compagnie Maritime 
Beige which sailed between Belgium and rhe Congo and the Kameruner Schiffahrrs-Gesell­
schaft, when, in due course, the imerests of the Woermann Line were rationalised.93 A!though 
Ballin, ulrimately, may have desired to bring the Woermann Line fully under his control,9' the 
means of the HAL were insufficient for such a purpose and required for more important fields. 
When, in 1913, the Woermann Line increased its capital to 20 million marks, the new funds 
were emirely raised by the existing owners.95 It was only during the Great War, under vastly 
different circumstances, that a new powerplay broke out in which Ballin, the Lloyd and Hugo 
Stinnes became involved in funher attempts to control the Woermann Line.96 
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The continued competirion between rhe Woermann Line and rhe two Bremen companies, 
after the HAL had intervened but before the agreement was signed, almost led to a serious rift 
between Ballin and his fellow Hamburg shipowners.97 In order to attack the Lloyd in one of 
its other fields, Woermann proposed opening a new line to Australia. The only continent not 
served by the HAL, Australia in Hamburg "belonged to" the DADG. Thus the matter needed 
to be discussed at a special meeting of the Syndikats-Rhederei, the fighting instrument of the 
alliance of Hamburg shipowners, created by Ball in in 1905. A crucial element of that alliance 
was mutual respect by all companies for each other's field of operations. Wirbout subtlety the 
DADG questioned the motives of the Woermann Line's choice of its battle field. The strong 
suspicion was voiced that Woermann was pushed by Ballin who might in this way find a back 
door for the HAL into tbe Australian trade. After a full and frank discussion no more was 
heard of the plan and soon peace was establisbed in the African trade. 
That Ball in did not hesitate to include Australia in his strategic perspectives became evident 
in 19 13 when, once again, open warfare with the Lloyd had broken out. He announced tbe 
opening of a new line to Australia wbich did not touch Hamburg and Bremen, but originated 
from Stertin and sailed via Emden and Antwerp. Emden was being promoted strongly by rhe 
Prussian government and wirb rhe call at Antwerp rhis new service could have clone real 
damage to rhe DADG. Although the Syndikats-Rhederei had been allowed to Japse in 191 1/ 
12, this meant breaking rhe understanding he had with the DADG, whom he forced to accept 
a new agreement.9s In excbange for some compensation in East Asia, which was more onerous 
than profitable, the DADG had to accept the HAL as fellow participant in the Australian 
trade. No details about the agreement were given to the public. 99 The new service was given u p 
when Ballin in early 19 14 reached agreement wirb the Lloyd, but be specifically reserved tbe 
rigbt to re-open it five years later.100 
In 19 14 came also tbe rakeover of the Deutsche Levante-Linie [D LL J by rhe HAL. This was 
the end of a long story, in which a hosr of groups had srruggled to gain control over the politic­
ally and economically important Levante trade. This mainly concerned Turkey but also 
Greece and Bulgaria. By centrast to the strongly-led Argo Line of Bremen, the Levante scene 
in Hamburg had more of a comic opera, in whicb rhe so-called princes' consonium [Fürsten­
gruppe J bad been a panicularly disruprive element.101 Although Ball in had followed develop­
ments at the DLL closely, ir is difficulr to see why just he and the HAL were bestplaced to rake 
over rhe Levante Line wben its own directors had revitalised the company (in 19 13 it paid a 
record dividend of 10% ) . In the process be also pushed aside Rob. M. Sloman jr. Ballin planned 
to open a joint HAL-DLL service to rhe United Stares which, in view of the eastward shift of 
European emigration, bad some potential for growtb.102 The Iiterature is unanimous thar he 
intended to Iet the DLL retain its own management, but the outbreak of war makes it impos­
sible to form a definitive judgement. On balance, rhe evidence on Ballin's motives in breaking 
into the Levante trade remains ambiguous. 
The picrure of rbe HAL's expansion is, of course, not complete without considering its 
investments and daughrer companies outside Hamburg. Several of these, such as the Compa­
gnie Maritime Beige, have been mentioned, others include the Atlantic Fruir Company, the 
Austro-Americana (of Triesre) , rhe Liverpool-based Gulf Transport Line, and the Ligure Bra­
siliana. Bur wirb rhese dimensions of the HAL one emers an entirely different arena rhan that 
of rhe Hamburg shipping scene which is the subject of rbis article. The ourbreak of the Great 
War marked a sharp end to the often aggressive expansion of the HAL wirhin Hamburg, al­
though Ballin's thoughts never left rhe subject. Indeed, during rhe war he developed ideas 
about a gigantic trust in which all Hamburg shipping inrerests could be combined and pre­
pared for rhe big struggle he expected once peace had been re-esrablished.103 Although nothing 
came from this, the 19 20s were to witness a further concentration of power wirhin Hamburg 
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which seemed to give credibility to Ballin's vision. I t was not unril the aftermath of the Great 
Depression that the independence of companies in their individual fields, once again, was 
accepted as guiding principle.104 
3. The Dynamics of Expansion 
In about 1 7  years Ballin bad made the HAL into the most complete global company in steam 
shipping. How must we evaluate the geographical expansion of the HAL, as opposed to its 
general growth in tonnage? The Iiterature has not skined the question. Bur it must be stressed 
that much of what has been written equates result with intention and that very Iinie attempt has 
been made to critically analyse the methods used by Ballin. Especially works like those of Hul­
dermann, Stubmann and also Murken, which have their origins in the HAL itself, must be read 
with caution. Representative of this genre is Kurr Himer, long-standing Ieader of the HAL's 
propaganda machine. He declared Ballin's policy to luve been rational and unambiguous, 
observing that Ballin strove to establish a "universal foundation" aimed at giving the HAL a 
profitable solidity. I n  his view it was on the basis of this "wise insight" that Ballin became t he 
great mediat or of i nt ernati onal  coope1·ati on i n  worl d shi ppi ng.10; In sharp cantrast to this " ra­
tionalist" theory Stands the very personified opinion of Max von Schinckel who may have 
known Ballin better than any other : 106 /t wa s Balli n's drea m t o  ta ke ov er all ot her Harn bu rg 
shi ppi ng compa ni es (a nd prefera bl y al so t hose of Bremen) a nd t o  merge t hem i nt o  t he HAL , a s  
he ha d done wit h  t he Ki ngsi n  Li ne, t he de F reita s Li ne a nd fi nall y al so t he L eva nt e Li ne a nd 
partl y al so bot h A fri ca n li nes. O nl y  t oo gla dl y he wo14l d al so ha ve swall owed t he Sout h A meri­
ca n, K osmos a nd A u stml [DADG] Li nes i n  ordert o bri ng e v er y t hi n g  u nder hi s scept re. 
As these opposing views show, B allin's policies can be interpreted very differently. In prac­
tice, both "commercial-rational" or objective and "personal-psychological" or subjective fac­
tors influenced Ballin's decisions; the historical problem is just to analyse the interrelationship 
between such diverse dynamics and to weigh the relative imponance of each. Moreover, there 
is the problem of assessing which motives can be accepted as valid and which represent no more 
than rationalisations or justifications in hindsight. In other words, the historical problem is not 
just to isolate B allin's influence on the development of the HAL, but also to investigate and 
assess the motives of his behaviour. 
In order to understand the development of Iiner shipping in general and in Ballin's era in 
panicular, it must be stressed that Iiner shipping possesses extremely strong autonomaus 
dynamics. 107 To put it in a nutshell, Iiner shipping offers regular services between two ports, or 
groups of ports, of which the most important features (above all: frequency, d ates of depanure 
and arrival, identity and tonnage of ships) have been fixed and advenised beforehand. Besides 
i ts head office in its homeport, the company in each port either has a branch office or employs 
a local firm as agent to whom existing and potential shippers can turn in order to obtain infor­
mation, book freight, etc. (The same applies to passenger traffic, alrhough there can exist a far 
more complex network of agencies throughout each port's hinterland. ) These offices and agen­
cies are rhe pivotal nerve centres of overseas trade: they link the profound insights into the 
structure and requirements of overseas commerce and build up relations wirb both importers 
and exponers throughout their pon's hinterland. It is because of this very centrality that, in 
Hamburg as in so many other pon cities, shipping agents played such an outstanding role in 
the transition from sail to steam and the founding of new steamshipping companies. 108 As the 
latter took up their business it remained an important task of the agents, as expens on the spot, 
to inform their principals and to stimulate them into opening new feeder and trunk lines to 
suppon, complement and expand those already in existence. 
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Thus it is possible to observe a gradual expansion of the network of virtually all successful 
transatlantic companies. Most often their fi rst line ran from their homeport in Europe to New 
York, but soon afterwards services to Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia, etc. followed. At the 
same time agencies in the USA could play an active role in urging the opening of new lines to 
the West Indies which could be particularly attractive if the company already had a service 
from Europe to that area. Conversely, a strong presence in New York could, as Cunard 
showed in the 1850s, Iead to setring up of cross trades with the Mediterranean. In the case of 
the HAL it was Ballin's  experience in migrant traffic which led to the opening of new lines 
from Italy to the USA and, later, also South America. Thus, from the very beginning Iiner ship­
ping is characterised by the continuous expansion and intensification of its network of ser­
vices, especially du ring periods of strong economic growth. 
The HAL was as much subject to rhese »Structural<< or >>objective<< forces as any other com­
pany. Part of its geographical expansion would also have come about without Ballin. Its West 
Indian service dated, as so many other Hamburg initiatives, from the early 1870s. In the North 
Atlantic one can easily observe a pattern of expansion as sketched in the previous paragraph, 
even if it soon became far more complex as also the Gulf of Mexico and Canada became involv­
ed. A similar development took p lace in the years after 1 900 in East Asia: after the opening of 
the trunk line from Hamburg to China quickly followed coastal services, a secondary line to 
Siberia and, in due course, a transpacific service to the American west coast. The Durch ship­
ping companies based on the East Indies and the British Ocean Steamship Company followed 
very similar policies.109 
Such "organic "  or "structural" dynamics, however, can only explain regional growth and 
not the worldwide expansion of the HAL. To a certain extent one might rationalise the entry 
of the company into the Brazil and La Plata trades in this manner (if they are seen as emerging 
from the existing Genua-La Plata and Hamburg-North Brazil services and related to the pas­
senger agency of the Hamburg-Süd held by the HAL), but this bore no relation to Ballin's  real 
motives in the affair. It is even more unrealistic to see Ballin's thrusts into East Asia, the west 
coast of Latin America, the Persian Gulf or Africa in this light. The contrast with the growth 
pattern of, for example, the British companies P & 0, British India, Eider Dempster and 
Ocean Steamship, or also the Durch East Indian companies is self-evident. 
For many observers at the time and later it was just the Iack of functional linkages between 
the various fields of the HAL which provided the key to Ballin's thinking and distinguished 
him from his contemporaries in world shipping. Above all, they saw Ballin's policy as con­
sciously aiming at a universalisation of the HAL in order to spread the risks of its !arge but until 
the late 1 890s almost exclusively North Atlantic investments over possibly many fields in 
order to make the company less susceptible to crises [krisenfest]. Himer's already cited words 
point clearly in this direction. Especially the severe depression of the early 1890s, which the 
HAL felt particularly badly as it was also hurt by Hamburg's terrible cholera epidemic of 1892, 
is supposed to have shown Ballin the vulnerability of the HAL and, more in general, that of all 
companies operaring in only one field. 
Theoretically, this observation appears quite plausible, but I do not believe that one can 
draw the conclusions from it which so often have been drawn. First, it is evident that in the 
modern world economy cyclical crises occur which are not limited to one particular area. On 
the contrary, as the Baring crisis of 1892 or also the crises of 1902/03 and 1908 demonstrated, 
they were remarkably global in scope and influenced all parts of the company. Thus the annual 
repon of the HAL for 1908 stated that d uring that year an average of 136,000 GRT had been 
laid up and identified the Sourh American trade besides the North Atlantic as severely affected 
by the slump.110 Investment risks were not so much spread as run in far more fields than pre­
viously - and that, of course, with a far high er nominal capital and company assets than before. 
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Between 189 7 and 1 907 the HAL issued new shares at a value of 95 million marks and in 1908 
Ballin had to raise another 30 million marks in debenture stock. Local problems, as cholera in 
Hamburg, catt!e plague in the Argentine, or a failure of the bean harvest in Manchuria, could 
occur everywhere. The financial resu!ts of the HAL were by no means " krisenfest" and its divi­
dends clearly followed the general cyclical patterns of the world economy. 
In fact, when it comes to profitabi!ity, there is no reason to believe that before the container 
revo!ution of the 1 9 60s and 19 70s the universal shipping company had any intrinsic advantages 
over smaller and more specialised enterprises. The evidence in Hamburg is unambiguous on 
this point. Berween 1900 and 19 13 the dividends paid by the specialist Hamburg-Süd, Kosmos, 
DADG and Bremen-based DDG Hansa were, on av·�rage, between two and three percent per 
year higher than those paid by the HAL. 111 By 19 i J other financial indicators, such as gearing 
ratios and the Ievel of reserves in proportion to share capita!, showed the HAL to be far less 
successful than those four companies.112 
At this point it must be stressed that at this time outside Germany no company existed with 
even vaguely a similar Iiner network to that of the HAL. Most British companies were active 
in only one field. The Ausn·alian lines of the P & 0 had emerged synergically from its Indian 
and Chinese services.113 Only the White Star Line sailed to both North America and Austra­
lia.114 The British Royal Mai! group of 1 9 11 was, as Ballin hirnself emphasised 115, a financial 
trust with very loose connections between the individual parts and it had nothing like the 
HAL's centralized administration and decision-rnaking centre. 1 16 The] apanese Nippon Yusen 
Kaisha, from a totally different location wirhin the world economy, operared services to India, 
Europe and Australia and the state-subsidised Messageries Maritimes (France) and Naviga­
zione Generale Italiana had lines to Australia as weil as Latin America. In all these cases polirical 
rather than commercial factors had led to such diversification. The only company which was 
truly comparable to the HAL was the North German Lloyd - as German as rhe HA L irself. 
lt would not be possible or useful to discuss here rhe full dynamics and extent of the rivalry 
between Lloyd and HAL, 117  but two aspects must be emphasised. The Lloyd was a global com­
pany even before Ballirr joined the HAL and also i n  its case political forces had been very signi­
ficant in shaping the growth of its Iiner network. The influence of politics can be observed on 
both the national-imperial and local level. When, in 1 884 /85, Bismarck and imperial Postma­
ster-General Heinrich von Stephan urged the introduction of subsidised mail services to East 
Asia and Australia they i nsisted that rhe two contracts be given to a single existing and expe­
rienced company.118 lt  was in accordance with current conditions that, besides the Lloyd, no 
other company could claim to be a credible candidate for the contracts. Suddenly, the Lloyd 
sailed between four continents: Europe, the Americas, Asia and Oceania. Bismarck's interven­
tion thus had enormaus repercussions for the future of the Lloyd and rhe structure of German 
shipping. In all rhis the Ieaders of the Lloyd fully accepted the fact that the mail services were 
not particularly profitable and, in fact, had a neganve influence on the f inancial results of the 
company; between 1890 and 1913 the dividends of the Lloyd annually averaged some two per­
cent less than those of the HAL. 1 19 T ransport-economically, Bremen was located so much less 
favourably than Hamburg that active overseas Iiner shipping was not just an economic enter­
prise in its own right but, perhaps even more important!y, also a vitally important means 
towards supporting and strengthening the economic life of its homeport. 120 During the early 
1870s the Lloyd itself had taken up the trade to South America, as otherwise not sufficient capi­
ta! could have been mobilised. 12 1 For this reason, too, the cooperation of the various shipping 
companies in Bremen was far more harmonious than in Hamburg. Equally, the Lloyd (and 
later also the DDG Hansa in its fields) was always derermined to challenge, match or outflank 
the HAL. In this titanic struggle between the two giants of world shipping it was often difficult 
to distinguish between offensive and defensive moves. 
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Because of the exceptional circumstances of the 1880s the North German Lloyd occupied a 
unique position in world shipping. This was clearly recognised and accepted as such in profes­
sianal circles. Ball in occasionally spoke disparagingly about the fragmentation [Parzellierung] 
of British shipping1 22, but the specialisation of companies like the P & 0, BISN, Royal Mail, 
Ocean Steamship, Gien Line, Cunard, etc. , was seen as organisational ly and entrepreneurially 
optimal. As, for example, Himer acknowledged and the companies' results clearly 
demonstrated, the specialised companies generally made higher profits and paid better divi­
dends. The Hamburg-Süd and Kosmos represented rhis type in Germany and, as has already 
been indicated, their restdts (1890-1 912 : three percent p. a. high er than those of the HAL !) and 
financial strength were considerably higher than those of the HAL. 123 Correspondingly, the 
individual companies wirhin the Morgan Trust and Royal Mai] group maintained a virtually 
complete autonomy - as was the case with the Bremen specialist companies which had been 
founded with the active support of the Lloyd :  Atlas-Linie, Roland-Linie and HABAL.124 
The actual series of events through which Ballin built up the global network of the HAL 
makes it highly im plausible that he was motivated by a policy designed to increase the financial 
security of his company. As the earlier section of this article has shown, his actions were above 
all driven by tactical opportunism. Moreover, he had very little regard for the price he paid for 
his expansion. lt is true, that Ballin had a good feeling for the timing of when to break into a 
new trade route. Although world t rade as a whole increased during his era, growth differed 
markedly from area to area. 125 Good strategic timing could result in over-proportional bene­
fits. Ir was exactly in the years before 1900 rhat East Asia and Latin America created great 
expectations in commercial eire! es in Germany and all through western countries which regar­
ded the conquest of overseas markets as existentially vital in their social-darwinist srruggles for 
survival. 1 26 Although such hopes never found realisation in China, the meteoric growth of Bra­
zilian coffee exports and the meat trade from La Plata gave credence to business optimism. Ir  
was also no coincidence that, whenever Ballin forced his way in through the purchasing of  a 
rival to the established Hambu.rg company (as was the case with de Freiras or rhe Dahlström­
Bramslöw project for the west coast traffic), rhe business climate was favourable - otherwise 
no such rival would have existed. Perhaps a similar optimism may l1ave played a role in the case 
of the Levante Line, but certainly rhis did not apply to Africa and the Persian Gulf. The con­
trast with the Lloyd may one more time be stressed : wirb the possible exception of the Gulf, 
rhe expansion of the HAL always took place in areas where other Harnburg companies were 
already active. 
Even if Ballin's opportunism contained more rhan a grain of justified optimism, bis de­
cisions were never inspi red by any attempt to calculate costs and benefits. As his friend Max 
Warburg expressed it , Bal lin was mo re arti st t han accou nt ant { me hr Kü nstle r als Re chne r} .1 27 
Several of the HAL's new lines made good money, especially when conference agreements 
resulted in sign ificant freight increases. Commenting on the agreement in the African trade 
Ballin pur it rather crudely: If t hree hone s have to e at i nste ad o f  o ne, mo re o at s  have to be put 
i n  t he t rou gh.128 Even so, rhe other services of the HAL hardly ever matched the profitability 
of its traditional trunk line to New York !129 
A final argument in favour of the universal liner company might be that its very size and net­
work could result in economics of scale or rationalisation. With regard to organisation it has 
already been remarked that contemporary opinion preferred the smaller specialist company 
dedicated in its purpose, organisation and fleet to the specific requirements of its field. Wirhin 
the HAL rhe various services were not integrated but remained i n  separate divisions. This was 
no more than realistic. Although, for example, both East Asia and La Plata were served by 
ships of 10,000 to 1 5,000 GRT, the commercial, geographical and climatological conditions of 
trade were so different that no degree of integration would luve been beneficial .  Merck's 
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memoires show that the HAL possessed a !arge number of extremely competent and energetic 
directors and section chiefs who wirhin their spheres weregiven a considerable amount of free­
dom. 1 30 Ultimately, however, all threads of power came tagether in Ballin 's hands. He was 
undisputedly a genius in the passenger business, but could hardly be expected to be an expert 
in all the many trades served by the HAL. It is doubtful, whether he was always sufficiendy 
informed when he made his decisions u1 In consequence, the very advantage of specialised 
expertise could be blunted through over-centralisation of power. 
In two aspects economics of scale might have occurred but, apparently, did not do so for the 
HAL: finance and new-building. Indeed, there is no evidence to show that the HAL raised 
new equity or debentures more easily or more cheaply than any other shipping company of 
good reputation in Hamburg. The Norddeutsche Bank was a great and continued supporter 
of the HAL, but Merck attacked the bank sharply for the manner in which it used its monopoly 
position to obtain excessive advantages.1 31 At the time of the !arge new emissions around 19 10 
the HAL was able to break through this bondage, which had been quasi-confirmed through 
Schinckel 's position on its Board of Control, and to carry out a much more flexible financial 
policy. Bur such liberty did not last long; by 19 14 all large German banks had made a common 
front against which the HAL despite its size was powerless to act.m 
It is equally difficult to see how the HAL could reap benefits from its enormaus building 
programs. The Royal Mai! group, which combined a !arge number of daughter companies 
active in quite different fields, was not capable of achieving significant results with such a 
policy after 19 18.134 Ball in did not even attempt to create such a policy. He gave all his orders 
on the open market, mostly competitively by render, and if economics could have been achiev­
ed through the building of series, such advantages would have been available to specialist com­
panies as weil. Ofren, however, the ships of one class were distributed over several shipyards 
and cosr a variety of prices. 1 35 Such a practice is certainly justified, as any service must be ini­
tiated with as homogeneaus a group of ships as possible, but Ballin often interfered and chan­
ged individual ship's specifications du ring construction. The P-class vessels for the New York 
service indeed were an extremely s uccessful example of such flexibility, but more often Ballin 
ordered ships individually.1 36 His directors and section chiefs complained bitterly abour his 
frequent alterations which, without exception, increased the ships' prices. An additional pro­
blem was that the rapid growth of the HAL led to ships being employed in other trade routes 
than for which they had originally been intended. The BLÜCHER and MOLTKE, for example, 
for many years sailed to New York, although they had been designed for the tropics. Alfred 
Jarcke, chief of the Brazil services, once quipped, when he learned of new ships being ordered 
for East Asia: T hat 's g reat, l' m s ure l ' ll g et t hem for Braz it. m  
Altogerher Ballin proceeded t ot ally unbus iness- like in placing orders.138 The worst case was 
that of the IMPERATOR: the Board of Control agreed to build this ship on the basis of a sketch 
made by Ballin's private secrerary Huldermann on the back of an envelope.139 Instead of the 
estimated 25 million marks the ship ultimately cost 38 millions, and its sistership VATERLAND 
no less than 42 millions. Ballin's centralisation of power clearly showed the disadvantages 
of the global company: O ft en t here were no ext ens ive cons ult at ions wit h t he varior�s s ect ions 
or a calculat ion about t he feas iblilit y of any proje ct . We could have s aved much money .140 Also 
von Schinckel referred later to the g eneral wast e in t he company's finances, which Merck's 
meticulous Supervision had not been able to prevent.141 That people like Merck and von 
Schinckel had allowed such conditions to continue says much about the hold Ball in had over 
the HAL. 
Financially, the HAL und er Ba! !in on balance derived more disadvamages than advamages 
from its size. But for Ballin 's arguments about the spreading of risks and/or economies of scale 
were never significant motives ; at the most he used them after his decision had been made as 
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justifications and rationalisations about what otherwise would certainly have been perceived 
in public as the disturbing growth of his company. There were indeed some observers who 
believed the greatest questions concerning the HAL were, whether such a monstrous concen­
tra ti on . . wa s hea lthy and wbat would happen to the company after Ballin's death. 142 
Having established the vital difference between wbat might have been the "structural" or 
"natural" growth of the HAL and the company's actual development, we can now turn to the 
more personal dynamics of Ballin's leadership. Above all, tbere was bis desire to beat the 
North German Lloyd. As has already been suggested earlier, Ballin's thoughts were consumed 
by the wish to overtake to Lloyd where both companies were active, to break into trades where 
the Bremen company had gained a footing, and elsewhere to open services where the Lloyd 
was still absenr.143 The fundamental rivalry between HAL and Lloyd, consequence but 
increasingly also dynamic cause of tbe profound competition between Harnburg and Bremen, 
can be feit in all bis moves and decisions. 144 It is certainly not dangeraus to speculate that it was 
tbis which, more than anything eise, was responsible for the fact tbat wirhin the HAL and 
Harnburg as a whole Ballin's aggressive behaviour towards bis fellow Harnburg shipowners 
was applauded or at least tolerated. 145 However this may be, it is hardly possible to under­
estimate the all-pervasive and existential struggle between the two Hansearie cities or to add 
new insights to it ;  Kurt Nathan, who originated from neutral Magdeburg, has formulated its 
main elements most effectively and elegantly.1 46 While Bremen needed the Lloyd to survive as 
a major economic cenrre, the very success of the Lloyd made that company both the example 
for and the major target of the HAL. The Lloyd's superiority over the HAL was never more 
pronounced tlun in the late 1880s. Indeed, the very reason for Ballin's enrry into the HAL in 
1886 was to end the debilitating rivalry between Hamburg's various shippi ng companies i n  tbe 
American trade which bad allowed the Lloyd to take such a commanding Iead and to enable the 
revitalised company to shift the balance again in favour of Hamburg. 
No HAL director or Harnburg shipowner would ever have lost sight of the rivalry with Bre­
men, but it is extremely doubrful whether anyone but Ballin would have acted wirb the same 
aggression, ambition and excessive progapanda147 and would have turned the HAL into the 
global company which he created. Ballin bad no hesitation in attacking the Lloyd wherever 
tbat company showed tbe Bremen flag and to attack other Hamburg companies in the process. 
With the possible exception of the Kingsin Line all these sister companies were perfectly 
capable of looking after their own inrerests and non e e ntered tbeir join t ventures wirb the HAL 
out of enrhusiasm or even free will. Without Ballin the HAL would have remained an Atlantic 
company. 
In tbe final analysis, therefore, it is impossible to overlook Ballin's personal and deeply­
seated Iust for power, the "Ballinismus" as it was called on rhe Harnburg exchange. One can, 
ultimately, only speculate about the origins of this drive and the importance of Ballin's origins 
from outside tbe patrician establishmenr of Hamburg. Specifically, it can not be proved that 
Ballin ever consciously aimed to succeed C. Ferd. Laeisz and Adolph Woermann as rhe "great­
est Hanseat", even if his funeral oration for the latter may suggest such ambitions.148 However 
this may be, there is no doubt tbat Ballin fully identified his historical roJe with the growth of 
the company as is shown in a Ietter he wrote in 19 01 about the establishmenr of a transpacific 
service. T he Ha mburg-A meri ca Li ne wi ll then ci rcle the globe a nd perha ps thi s Pa ci fi c  Li ne wi ll 
be my swa nsong . . .  149 There is, indeed, no qualification in the famous and well-publicised 
motto Ballin gave rhe HAL and the eh allenge he set himself :  M y  fi eld i s  the world [M ei n  F eld 
i st di e W elt} . I have little doubt rhat von Schinckel was right in believing tbat Ballin bad no ra­
tional or finite objectives but, instead, aimed to conq uer the world.150 He was driven by nervous 
energy from within, not by any definable target in his economic environmenr.  Only this can 
explain Ballin's expansionism, his vendetta against the Lloyd, and the continuous pressure 
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which applied to his fellow shipowners in Hamburg. The telling phrase: I know, but I w ant the 
bu si ness, does not only relate to the South American business of the outsider de Freitas, but 
also to the entire establishment of Hamburg's overseas Iiner companies. 
4. Conclusion 
Without Ballin, his personal aims and ambitions, and the strategy he adopted to obtain his 
objectives the HAL would have remained a specialist Nonh Atlantic company. In conse­
quence, the position of the HAL wirhin Harnburg and the structure of German Iiner shipping 
as a whole would have developed quite differently. Less intra-German rivalry would also have 
created less pressure for foreign shipping and, most probably, outside Germany less apprehen­
sion would have been feit about the fast-growing German Liner companies. Ballin changed the 
mission and direction of the HAL in revolutionary fashion. His actions can only be under­
stood by accepting that he was not a man of peace or compromise. During this period of 
growth and concentration in all branches of the modern world economy many small enter­
prises lost their independence, but the question remains to what extent their fate was an inevit­
able and im personal part of a " natural" process of rationalisation and to what extent the result 
of the megalomania and power politics of the leading entrepreneurs. The development of the 
HAL demonstrates that personal and psychological facts indeed could play an extraordinarily 
powerful role, probably more so than rational commercial dynamics. In the historical record 
too often only the victors speak. Thus there was, and often still is, a sharp cantrast between the 
images of peace and friendly cooperation created by the HAL's "Literarische Büro" and per­
petuated by later historians and the harsh reality of pressure and violence with which Ball in 
confronted his Harnburg colleagues. But the more the HAL grew and was regarded as the 
embodiment of Hamburg's pride and strength, the less Hamburg's public was inclined to ask 
questions about the aims or methods of the company or to criticise its relatively low divi­
dends. 1 5 1  Also wirhin shipping circles and the HAL itself criticism remained muted and impo­
tent. Even the critical Siegfried Heckscher and Johannes Merck himself, who at least once 
intended to resign, could not free themselves from the glamour of the HAL. 152 Ballin had made 
it into something far !arger than a mere collection of ships and services: the Hamburg-America 
Line was the very essence of commercial Harnburg and it was a rare person who dared turn his 
back on it. 153 
This judgement should not imply that Ballin's dictatorial leadership of the HAL and his 
aggressive behaviour against his fellow Hansearie shipowners had a negative influence on the 
economic growth of their cities. On the contrary, the rivalry and growth of all companies and 
the rough-and-tumble of shipping politics produced powerful stimuli to Germany's overseas 
trade, shipbuilding and many other forward and backward linkages. Inevitably, and indeed 
often intentionally, these had a significant and positive impact on the country's leading ports 
and port cities. Although the impact of the HAL's growth on Hamburg has never been ana­
lysed in specific terms, it is not too daring to suggest that it was feit throughout the city. Above 




Here I wish to express my deep gratitude to the Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation . Without its 
financial support this  study could never have been undertaken. I dedicate this article to the memory of 
Walter Kresse without whom I would never have travelled to Hamburg. 
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th is fashion he tried to match his Bremen rival, rhe Nonh German Lloyd [Norddeutscher Lloyd], 
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